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There is a view, common among academics and educators alike, that educa-
tion is but an applied area of study, one in which the methods of the tradi-
tional disciplines are used to address school related problems. Education is 
taken in this way because it is said to have no methodological principles or 
conceptual domain that it can call its own. Unlike disciplines such as 
physics or chemistry or economics, which are thought of as pure disciplines 
with an applied wing, education is thought to be unbounded. It cannot claim 
to be examining bodily motion, or the interaction of elements, or market 
behavior. Similarly, it is argued that educational studies is deficient 
because it can lay no claim to a unique methodology. Experimental design, 
statistical methods or ethnographic techniques do not belong first to educa-
tion. They are methods developed in other areas which are sometimes useful in 
addressing issues and problems that we find in schools. Because educational 
studies is said to lack both a conceptual domain and an identifiable method, 
it is thought to have no coherent research program. Rather, it must take 
problems from the schools as the schools give them. Thus it is concluded that 
with education we have a "discipline" without a method, without substance, and 
without coherence. 
I state this position strongly not simply because I want to take issue 
with it and argue that the study of education, while applicable to the prac-
tices of schools, is consistent with the notion of a liberal field of study, 
but also because this is a view that dominates the thinking about education 
that is found in many of our most important academic institutions. Too often 
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education exists on the periphery of academic life and is perceived as a field 
comprised of renegades from the schools and outcasts from the disciplines. 
To take objection to this view is to begin to define a direction for the 
study of education, a direction which one can already find in the ongoing work 
of many educational scholars, but which requires articulation and development. 
In this paper I want to address the question of the place of educational stud-
ies within a university. I begin by looking at the question of the relation-
ship between a discipline and its method and domain. I then address the ques-
tion of the domain of educational studies as I have been trying to conceptual-
ize it and sketch some of its major features. Finally I draw out some of the 
implications of this domain for the practical aspects of education. 
It is useful to note that the ideal of a discipline against which educa-
tional studies has been measured and found wanting is, in fact, an ideal, 
which accepted disciplines meet only to varying degrees. In some disciplines, 
such as philosophy, the nature of the conceptual domain is often a central 
issue of debate. Ironically, without a prior understanding of the boundaries 
of the discipline, it is difficult to decide just who can and who cannot 
legitimately participate in that debate. 
Other disciplines, economics is one of them, have been able to stipulate 
a realm that meets with broad consensus among its practitioners. Yet the bor-
ders of a conceptual realm, even when well defined, may not always map well 
onto the activities of practical life, and disciplinary neatness may be accom-
plished at a considerable cost. Consider, for example, the ups and downs of a 
plan recently proposed by the economist Alan Enthoven to hold down the rate of 
increase of hospital costs.^ Enthoven's plan seemed to fit well into the view 
of rational, market behavior that has been adopted by the Reagan adminis-
tration, and the plan was met by favorable acclaim from key administration 
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officials. Yet as the plan was debated within the administration, some 
elements of it, such as a ceiling on the tax write-offs that businesses could 
claim for health insurance, were seriously questioned and were likely to be 
dropped. Enthoven saw this behavior as irrational. His plan was not meant 
to be implemented piece by piece. Its effectiveness depended, according to 
him, on viewing each of its elements as part of a coherent whole. From his 
point of view, he was seeing irrationality at work. Yet one suspects that 
from the administration's point of view what was occurring was not irrational. 
Rather, the boundaries of economic rationality had spilled over into the field 
of political rationality. 
The question then arises do we then pass the problem over to the politi-
cal scientist to understand, as if we were running a relay race passing a ba-
ton from one runner to the next? If we decide to do this, then we still have 
the problem of deciding whether politically rational behavior consists of gen-
erating the broadest support for the plan as Enthoven conceived it, or whether 
it consists of retaining only those elements of the plan for which support is 
likely? The answer to this question will depend upon the conception of ratio-
nality that particular political scientists bring to bear on the issue. 
Some social scientists have tried to argue that there is but one, 
broadly based concept of rational behavior. For example, some have argued 
that the behavior of groups, whether it be economic, social, or political be-
havior, can be reduced to the behavior of individuals as governed by the laws 
of positive and negative reinforcement. I find this conception of rationality 
useful for redescribing events, but as a conception of rational behavior it is 
wanting because what constitutes positive or negative reinforcement is not the 
foundation of an explanation—an invariable law of human nature. It is rather 
the product of a human interpretation. In one culture pork is an important 
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source of nutrition. In another, to eat it is sacrilegious. Human beings 
have a remarkable capacity to turn what behaviorists identify as positive 
reinforcers into negative ones and negative reinforcers into positive ones and 
this in turn is what often needs to be understood. 
It is useful when thinking about the nature of a discipline to remember 
that the boundaries of disciplinary rationality do not always correspond to 
those of practical rationality and that when the latter oversteps the limits 
of the former our understanding is not always improved by passing the problem 
to the next discipline. This observation does not provide education studies 
with an advantage over other areas. It simply raises questions about the pre-
sumed disadvantage. 
If the relationship between a discipline and a domain is problematic, 
then so too is the relationship between a discipline and a method. For exam-
ple, not so long ago some renegade economists claimed that if we really want 
to know about market behavior we should try to understand, through observa-
tional studies, just how people think and behave when they act in the market 
place. This would be a rather novel approach for the dismal science and one 
can imagine the next generation of economists trading in their now outdated 
computers for the newest technological innovation--a credible informant--and 
then tramping off to an Indonesian village with Clifford Geertz to learn the 
techniques of participant-observation. The example may be far fetched but the 
point is not. There is at best a loose connection between a discipline and a 
method. Historians use statistics, anthropologists use history and often by 
so doing their own disciplines are enriched. 
The difficulty is not that real disciplines have a clear-cut domain and 
education does not. Nor is it that for each discipline, except education, 
there is a single, clear and identifiable method. Domains are not sealed in 
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cement and distributed one to a discipline. They are convenient ways that 
have been developed for marking off and thinking about the natural and the 
cultural worlds. They are no doubt bounded in some ways, but the boundaries 
are best thought of as open in texture allowing for nourishment, growth, and 
division to take place. Similarly, a method is a tool. Its function is to 
serve a particular purpose, but its use and refinement may extend well beyond 
the purpose for which it was originally developed. A method may originate 
because of the problems that arise in a given discipline at a certain time, 
but it does not emerge with a deed of ownership that it presents to its devel-
oper. One discipline does not borrow the methods of another because without a 
title of ownership, no discipline can stand in the position of lender. 
The difficulty of establishing educational studies as a liberal field 
comes not from want of method or lack of domain, but from equally important, 
yet sometimes conflicting expectations. The first of these is the scholarship 
required to add perspective to and improve our understanding of the processes 
and aims of education as it functions in social life. The second has to do 
with the social responsibility to maintain and improve the institutions of 
schools. While these tasks are related, they are not the same. We should 
expect that some of the scholarly perspective will be drawn from a better 
understanding of the practice of schooling, just as we should also expect that 
a deeper understanding of the activity and aims of education will help to 
refine that practice. Yet to understand education requires more than an anal-
ysis of what happens in schools, and sometimes what is of immediate practical 
value for schooling does not require a great deal of scholarly sophistication. 
In theory this expectation is not different from that which we have about 
legal scholarship. We expect that the thoughtful study of the law will inform 
the judicial system and help provide some of the insights needed to improve 
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it. Yet legal scholarship extends well beyond the law as it functions in the 
courts of one's own time or location. In doing so it provides a context for 
understanding the present legal system. The difference between educational 
and legal scholarship lies in the fact that education work has too often been 
judged by its promise for immediate payoffs. It is more appropriate, however, 
to acknowledge that the activities of the schools are but one of the practices 
that such scholarship seeks to understand and that as part of an organized, 
compulsory system of education, schools are relatively recent educational 
innovations. 
When attempting to articulate a domain for educational studies it is 
useful to observe that academic domains are constituted in different ways. 
Some domains, especially those of the natural sciences, are constituted by 
focusing upon a single attribute or characteristic of an object. Here we are 
interested in an object only insofar as it is a manifestation of that charac-
teristic. In classical physics, for example, the actual object is irrelevant 
(it may be an apple, a rock or a planet) except say insofar as it is a mani-
festation of bodily motion. There are other domains which are constituted as 
an attempt to understand an object in its fullness and uniqueness, and to cap-
ture the contours of significance that the object itself holds. These disci-
plines often comprise what Dilthey called the cultural sciences. Each of 
these ways of constituting a discipline carries with it methodological impli-
cations, and the problems of confusing one with the other is well illustrated 
by Clifford Geertz, drawing on an example developed by Gilbert Ryle. 
Consider . . . two boys rapidly contracting the eyelids of the 
right eye. In one this is an involuntary twitch; in the other, a 
conspiratorial signal to a friend. The two movements are, as 
movements, identical; from an I-am-a-Camera, "phenomenalistic" 
observation of them alone, one could not tell which was twitch and 
which was wink. Yet the difference, however unphotographable, 
between a twitch and a wink is vast; as everyone unfortunate 
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enough to have had the first taken for the second knows. The 
winker is communicating and indeed communicating in a quite pre-
cise and special way. . . . The winker has done two things, con-
tracted his eyelids and winked, while the twitcher has done only 
one, contracted his eyelids. Contracting your eyelids on purpose 
when there exists a public code in which doing so counts as a con-
spiratorial signal is winking. 
Educational scholarship has tended to vacillate between these views. 
Sometimes the emphasis is placed on methods that are thought to have signifi-
cant power to generalize and predict while at other times the emphasis has 
been to capture the unique contours of a particular learning situation. For 
the most part, however, in both types of study, the school and its activities 
have been taken as defining the domain of educational research, and each study 
has difficulty transcending the school's definition of an educational problem. 
A more fruitful way to constitute the domain of educational studies is 
to attempt, through the identification of a common function, to capture the 
universal features which are represented by the practice of education while 
also recognizing the various forms that these features may take in specific 
situations. After all, even the most committed ethnographers must presuppose 
some shared, intercultural categories as they go about trying to understand 
the uniqueness of social life. In other words, there must be some taken for 
granted categories which allow us to describe even the most unique social 
units and which allow us to classify certain people as members of that society 
rather than simply as an aggregate of individuals. For example, to recognize 
that a certain ceremony is to be taken humorously or ironically rather than 
seriously or literally, is to place it in a general category which transcends 
the specific and unique culture in which it is being performed. 
It is the attempt to identify the universal aspects of educational prac-
tice that constitutes the important feature of those studies which look upon 
education as the process of socialization or cultural transmission. However, 
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these studies represent only a partial understanding of educational practice 
and are mistaken in viewing the study of education itself as simply a part of 
sociology or anthropology. 
Studies of socialization and also those of cultural transmission have 
tended to take as their problem the way in which an individual becomes a mem-
ber of a group. Traditional socialization research begins by accepting the 
structure of social relations as fixed and unproblematic. The focus of under-
standing is directed at the individual and seeks to analyze just how that 
individual takes on the behavior and roles that society defines as appropri-
ate. Whereas the society is perceived as fixed and unchanging, the individual 
is treated as if adaptable to any structure that can develop a sufficient 
socializing apparatus. 
What is missing from this account is the fact that society itself is 
continually recreated, although not always in the same form, through a shared 
understanding in which all of its members, to one degree or another, and 
within different frameworks, participate. The production of a society is a 
function of the development of such shared understanding and this production 
is the primary function of education, first as a social activity and only 
later as a social institution. Thus, while it is productive to view educa-
tional studies in terms of an analysis of a universal feature of social life, 
individual socialization is only a derivative aspect of that study. That is, 
educational studies is conceived of here as the study of the way in which a 
society reproduces itself over time and the various patterns of understanding 
that comprise the product of that reproduction. 
In order to understand what this entails we can return briefly to look 
at the notion of socialization and distinguish it from that of social repro-
duction. One distinction is obvious. Individuals are socialized, but a soci-
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ety is reproduced. When we are studying social reproduction, we are examining 
the normative structure into which individuals are socialized. If we look 
again at the process of socialization, we should begin to see where it inter-
sects with that of social reproduction. 
When an individual is socialized what has occurred is that the person 
has learned a given role or set of roles along with the behavior that is 
appropriate to that set. Yet socialization also involves learning how one's 
own role functions in relationship to others and learning that in any specific 
situation appropriate role behavior is defined relationallyI A simple example 
is drawn from the fact that behavior appropriate for the corporal in the pres-
ence of the private is not always appropriate in the presence of the captain. 
This means that one of the key factors entailed in learning the set of behav-
iors that define a given role is learning when it is appropriate to exhibit a 
specific subset of that behavior. What this suggests, however, is that when 
socialization occurs what is learned is not just a set of behaviors, but a set 
of socially shared categories and definitions that are understood relationally 
to one another, such as worker to owner, husband to wife, mother to daughter, 
and so forth. What remains to be understood after the sociologists have done 
their work is the patterns of understanding out of which role behavior is gen-
erated. It is this pattern and the processes used to reproduce it that I take 
to constitute the domain of educational studies. 
The study of education as social reproduction is the study of patterns 
and processes through which a society's identity is maintained and within 
which social change is defined. The practice of education in this sense has 
two functions. First, there is the reproduction of skills that meet socially 
defined needs. Second, there is the reproduction of consciousness or the 
shared understanding that provides the basis of social life. This shared 
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understanding includes the sense that people have of the interrelationship and 
purpose of different skills as well as a sense of the way in which the bearers 
of different skills, as they occupy different social positions, are supposed 
to behave in this or that context.^ The task of educational scholarship, how-
ever, is not restricted to simply reflecting such forms or understanding them 
in precisely the same way as those who participate in them fully. In contrast 
to the unreflective and naturalistic understanding of the participant, the 
function of educational scholarship is to reflectively understand these rela-
tionships as social constructions with historical antecedents and thereby to 
initiate an awareness that these patterns, or at least some of them, are 
objects of choice and possible candidates for change. Thus, educational 
scholarship adds a reflectively critical dimension to the social activity of 
education. 
A comprehensive analysis of education for any given society would 
include an examination of the structure, production and distribution of knowl-
edge as well as the scope of knowledgeable activity and the level of knowledge 
which is presumed attached to given social roles. Thus, the study of educa-
tion as social reproduction examines both the way in which knowledge is pro-
duced and the way in which it is distributed in a society. For example, 
physicians and nurses are presumed to share knowledge over essentially the 
same range of activity, that is the scope of their knowledge is similar. How-
ever, the presumed knowledge of the disease process and its treatment is 
thought to differ in terms of level, a difference which is reflected in the 
formal education and status of the two groups. Whereas the concept of scope 
describes the nature of the field over which knowledge is exercised, the con-
cept of level differentiates the roles within a field and provides an under-
standing of the variations in status that are attached to different roles. 
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Hence, using health care again as an example, while one of the major functions 
of physicians is to prescribe medication, they are usually not prohibited from 
dispensing it, at least in small doses, and the institutional assumption is 
that the knowledge involved in dispensing is available to physicians if they 
would choose to make use of it. The role of the pharmacist, however, is 
restricted to dispensing an order from the physician and the institutional 
assumption is that the act of prescribing is beyond his or her trained capac-
ity. One can often understand the conflicts between established and aspiring 
professions as involving attempts to alter perceptions about the scope or 
level of knowledge possessed by a given group. Such conflicts often involve a 
challenge to the institutionally sanctioned presumptions about knowledge. 
Hence in arguing the case for greater professional autonomy, nurses deny that 
physicians and nurses share the same scope of knowledge. Physicians are said 
to be proficient in clinical judgments related to crisis intervention, while 
nurses are seen as experts in the social and cultural factors which affect the 
way in which patients cope with disease. Similarly, pharmacists attempt to 
affirm their independence over physicians by claiming a greater level of 
understanding about the interaction of drugs. Such challenges are really 
attempts to rearrange the skills associated with a given role and hence to 
change the way in which the role is perceived. 
The educational system, both formal and informal, functions to reproduce 
and distribute or redistribute skills as they are clustered into roles and 
thereby it serves to maintain or to alter the work relations in society. 
Included with the reproduction of skills is the reproduction of ideas about 
the ownership of knowledge and the reproduction of ideas about the rights and 
responsibilities of those who possess certain forms of institutionally granted 
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knowledge. This aspect of education may be seen as the reproduction of con-
sciousness . 
Thus, the reproduction of consciousness is the other side of the repro-
duction of skills. It is the factor that enables the clustering of skills 
into specific roles and the clustering of roles into specific classes to per-
sist in societies where it provides the normative vision that justifies the 
existing distribution. In other words, a consciousness is reproduced which 
codes the exercise of the rights, privileges, duties and obligations associ-
ated with the possession of a certain set of skills as just, fair, and accept-
able (or, in unstable societies, as unjust, unfair and not acceptable). The 
term "knowledge code" is intended to suggest that education imparts, in addi-
tion to a set of skills, a certain mode of consciousness, a way of thinking, 
about the network of such skills. We learn, for example, what is high and low 
status knowledge and we also learn, either through manner, mode of expression, 
dress or physical environment, how to appraise and communicate to people with 
differently valued skills. We learn the range of activity over which a person 
with a certain level of knowledge is to be granted authority. Thus, a knowl-
edge code ideally binds together the reproduction of skills and the reproduc-
tion of consciousness and its formal articulation is to be understood as an 
interrelated body of arguments and beliefs about the relative value and inter-
relationship of different skills. Formal education can be understood as a 
consciously designed and institutionalized system of instruction that func-
tions to maintain a given knowledge code and to further the pattern of intel-
lectual development that is associated with it. 
With this basic sketch behind us, we now turn to look at some of the 
different kinds of projects that may be suggested by it. The struggle between 
the medical and nursing professions, mentioned earlier, is a useful place to 
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begin. The attempt by nursing to establish greater independence from the med-
ical profession can be understood in part as an effort to redefine the knowl-
edge code involved in health care delivery by disengaging the knowledge base 
of nursing from that of medicine, reclustering the skills associated with the 
role of the nurse and reworking the professional consciousness of nurses and 
physicians. 
The difficulty that nurses have had in establishing their own profes-
sional identity can be understood largely by the institutional assumption that 
nursing knowledge is but a subset of medical knowledge, an assumption which is 
now being challenged by many nurses. The developments now occurring provide 
an opportunity for educational scholars to analyze the process whereby a group 
sets out to consciously redefine its essential knowledge base. The issues 
that this attempt involves are many; there are questions about the reworking 
of basic definitions of health and disease; there are issues about the rela-
tive worth of clinical, scientific, and social science knowledge in health 
care; there is the question of the way in which professional dominance and 
male dominance intermingle in the relations between occupational groups; and 
there are questions about the implications that an emerging professional iden-
tity has for formal educational structures. 
One way to think more generally about the issues developing in health 
care is to recognize that different groups and individuals, depending upon the 
nature of their developed skills, stand in different relations to a knowledge 
code and view it through different frames. Because of this, a knowledge code 
has built into it a potential instability. Most segments of society will be 
expected to take on faith the fact that the definition and distribution of 
high status knowledge is justified, but with the exception of the initiated, 
most will only be able to view such knowledge from the outside. As long as 
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there is a general acceptance that the clustering of skills and the definition 
and distribution of high status knowledge comprise a natural process or are of 
functional benefit to all, stability will likely remain. As in the cases of 
many nurses who still identify closely with the medical profession, this sta-
bility is an indication of a tight bond between a code and its relevant 
frames. 
Yet because a frame provides a perspective for viewing a knowledge code, 
it is always possible that the dominant code or some aspect of it will be de-
naturalized and looked at as just another framework, one that belongs to and 
simply rationalizes the position of the dominant social group. It is inter-
esting that some medical students whom I have interviewed view the basic medi-
cal science courses in this way, as simply an initiation rite without func-
tional value. Were this perception to be held on a large scale it would be a 
sign of a crisis of confidence within the profession, and the potential insta-
bility of a knowledge code might begin to erupt from within as it becomes dis-
engaged from those who are expected to be the prime bearers of that code. 
The instability of a code is not, however, simply a function of the way 
in which it is tied to its relevant frames. It is also a function of the way 
in which those who are antagonistic to a dominant code are able to communicate 
their individual frameworks to one another. Such communication is often the 
major weapon of informal culture groups, occurring both in the classroom and 
the work place, and it often takes the sophisticated skills of an ethnographer 
to decipher. When there is good reason to believe that there is not a radical 
difference between the official meanings of the dominant code and the shared 
meanings of the relevant frames, then it seems appropriate to apply standard-
ized research procedures. However, when such congruence cannot be assumed, 
then it is difficult for standard procedures to capture the event. For exam-
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pie, the efficiency engineer can describe in detail the formal, task-directed 
behaviors of the workers on the shop floor and when the workers share the 
basic goals of the enterprise this may be all that is required. When such 
goals are not shared, however, what the efficiency engineer cannot capture are 
the swaggers and posturing which his or her very presence triggers. Indeed if 
timed correctly, the engineer will simply take these as the natural behavior 
of working class people. Yet it is precisely this posturing that serves as 
the network through which these people may communicate to one another their 
shared framework of antagonism. The presence of the engineer of course is, 
for them, simply the symbol of the object of this antagonism, i.e., the basic 
goals and purposes of the organization. The other side of this process 
involves the design of formal bureaucratic organizations which are often 
structured in such a way as to minimize the possibility of lateral communica-
tion. 
By identifying the domain of educational studies as that of social 
reproduction, it is possible to focus the concerns of educational scholarship 
and to cement its interdisciplinary character. The study of education as 
social reproduction shifts the basic unity of these disciplines from a 
strictly pragmatic one that is called into operation to repair dysfunctions in 
the schools to an organic one in which each discipline focuses on a different 
moment in the reproductive process. The problems of schools are not forgot-
ten, however, because in contemporary society they comprise a major vehicle 
for social reproduction. 
Under such a conception, educational philosophy might be concerned to 
analyze the formal coherence of the knowledge code while exploring some of the 
conceptual ambiguities and problems which might be concealed by it. Educa-
tional history could attempt to explore the forces that were instrumental in 
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its development while studies in literature could explore the way in which, 
through metaphor and other communicative structures, a code is extended from 
one area of study to another. The social sciences might be concerned to 
understand the way in which the present code extends or limits possibilities 
for different segments of the social order while the behavioral sciences might 
attempt to elaborate the way in which present forms of reproduction and the 
present distribution of skills influence the frames through which the existing 
code is perceived. 
The important consideration, however, is not the particular way in which 
the various disciplinary traditions might decide to distribute the conceptual 
domain of education. It is rather that by recognizing that there is a reason-
ably clear domain for educational studies that the work of these disciplines 
and their problematics are altered. A clearer understanding of the domain 
provides educational studies with a more coherent program regardless of the 
particular discipline or method needed at a given time. 
Moreover, an understanding of the variety of frameworks that children 
bring with them to school has some important implications for understanding 
classroom behavior and for helping to improve the teaching process. For exam-
ple, different frameworks will often entail different rules about the context 
in which truth telling is appropriate and even what constitutes telling the 
truth. In some situations where there is a presumption of shared antagonism 
and illegitimate authority, saying what happened will not be seen as telling 
the truth, but as an acknowledgement of submissiveness. Whether saying what 
happened will be taken as truth telling will depend on who says it, in what 
setting and to whom it is said. This is the case in the classroom, the shop, 
and the corporation. For example, in the corporation certain matters may be 
shared on a private level, and may be widely, but privately acknowledged to be 
16 
the case. However, to utter these matters publicly is not taken as truth 
telling, but as indiscretions, or signs of untrustworthiness. The reason this 
is so is not too difficult to analyze formally. There are important practical 
differences between: (1) my knowing something is the case; (2) my knowing 
that you also know it is the case; (3) my knowing that you know that I know it 
is the case; and (A) you and I knowing that it is publicly known that together 
we know it is the case. Each of these stages comes closer to forcing choice 
and action. It is important for teachers to understand these formal aspects 
so that they are not prone to label children with a somewhat' different set of 
truth telling rules as simply deviants. In other words, teachers need to know 
what may be at stake in certain instances where truth telling and displays of 
other values are being called for. 
That the understanding of classroom behavior can often be improved by 
understanding the interaction between an official code and its relevant frames 
can be illustrated by looking at a study by Paul Willis of working class boys 
in an English school.^ The focus of Willis' ethnographic account was a small 
subgroup of troublemakers who called themselves The Lads. With the exception 
of The Lads, when order is maintained in the school, as it is with most, it is 
because the students' own cultural framework allows them to accept the basic 
knowledge code as articulated by teachers. The official, but sometimes 
implicit message of the school, is that if students respect the teacher's 
authority, the teacher will provide them with worthwhile (usually theoretical) 
knowledge which will lead to a meaningful credential, which will then lead to 
a promising job. For The Lads, however, this exchange breaks down. For them 
one damn job is the same as any other (as one of them put it after a lecture 
on becoming an interior decorator, "Got to be someone who slops on walls"), 
hence the credential is meaningless, the knowledge literally useless and the 
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respect bogus. For most students in the school, order, discipline, and truth 
telling as teachers define it are part of the bargain. For The Lads the same 
values are viewed as complicity with an illegitimate authority and a violation 
of their own group norms. 
Willis1 study is but one example of the kind of research project that 
fits into the model of education as social reproduction. Yet the process by 
which subordinate frameworks influence the way in which different groups come 
to relate to the dominate knowledge structure is an area that educational 
scholarship has only begun to explore, and even Willis' insightful treatment 
of The Lads' working class subculture calls out for an analysis on other 
levels. 
Willis believes that in their understanding of the world of work, The 
Lads display many insights into the oppressive nature of capitalism. The 
author calls these insights, "penetrations." Penetrations reveal an under-
standing into the deeper requirements and determining forces of capitalist 
society. These penetrations do not, according to Willis, provide the kind of 
theoretical understanding which, through an analysis of the mechanisms of dom-
ination, would provide the perspective and strategy required to act on such 
insights. To put it somewhat differently than Willis does, the insights that 
he perceives as truths about capitalism are not perceived by The Lads in this 
way. To The Lads these are truths about life itself. Capitalism, while cen-
tral to Willis' analysis, is really only incidental to The Lads' own under-
standing. Thus when they observe that someone has to do society's nasty work, 
or that one job is the same as any other, they are not intending to provide a 
critique of capitalism. It is rather Willis who sees these observations as 
such a critique. To The Lads, their observations are rather expressions about 
life itself. In other words, their understanding of work is not perceived by 
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them as an insight into capitalism, but rather as an insight into the natural 
law of social organization. What stunts The Lads' understanding and enables 
their own insights to be used to place them on the shop floor is their own 
inbred functionalism. This is what in fact limits their penetrations. Willis 
correctly perceives these as limitations. However, it remains to analyze 
their conceptual source and to provide a critique of their moral authority. 
Willis' study is an example of the way in which an analysis of one aspect 
of the reproductive process points to the need to examine other aspects. His 
work is not ultimately an analysis of The Lads' subculture. It is a critique 
of capitalism and an exploration of the mechanisms that it employs to repro-
duce class inequality. Yet the implicit conflict between The Lads' function-
alist acceptance of capitalism and Willis' critique of it provides the mate-
rial for a different kind of analysis, one which explores the possibilities 
for a reclustering of skills that are available in contemporary society. In 
other words, the kind of educational scholarship described here as educational 
studies requires a critique of the social product of reproduction as well as 
an exploration of the mechanisms, whether cultural or economic, through which 
reproduction takes place. 
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